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Abstract—We consider distributed computation of generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) over networks, in games with shared
coupling constraints. Existing methods require that each player
has full access to opponents’ decisions. In this paper, we assume
that players have only partial-decision information, and can
communicate with their neighbours over an arbitrary undirected
graph. We recast the problem as that of finding a zero of a
sum of monotone operators through primal-dual analysis. To
distribute the problem, we doubly augment variables, so that
each player has local decision estimates and local copies of
Lagrangian multipliers. We introduce a single-layer algorithm,
fully distributed with respect to both primal and dual variables.
We show its convergence to a variational GNE with fixed
step-sizes, by reformulating it as a forward-backward iteration
for a pair of doubly-augmented monotone operators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games
with shared coupling constraints arise in various network
scenarios where a set of players (agents) compete for limited
network resources, e.g. power grids and smart grids, [2],
optical networks, [3], wireless communication networks, [4],
[5], electric vehicle charging, [7]. The study of GNE dates
back to [8], [9]; a historical review is provided in [10], [11].
Distributed GNE computation in monotone games has seen
an increasing interest in recent years, [5]–[7], [12]–[19]. Most
works assume that each player has access to all other agents’
decisions - the classical setting of full-decision information,
either by observation or by a central node coordinator.
There are many current networked applications where
agents may only access or observe the decisions of their
neighbours, and there is no central node to provide them with
global information, i.e., a partial-decision information setting.
The assumption of information exchange is motivated in
networks where there is no central node that has bidirectional
communications with all players to provide them with global
information, as in peer-to-peer networks. Application scenarios
range from spectrum access in cognitive radio networks, where
users adaptively adjust their operating parameters based on
interactions with the environment and other users in the
network, [20], congestion games in ad-hoc networks, [21],
to networked Nash-Cournot competition, [22], and opinion
dynamics in social networks, [23], [24]. These examples are
non-cooperative in the way decisions are made (each agent
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minimizes its own cost function), while agents exchange
locally information with neighbours to compensate for the
lack of global information on others’ decisions. The first
results on distributed NE seeking under such partial-decision
information have been for finite-action games, [25], and
for aggregative games with no coupling constraints, [26].
Results were extended to general continuous-kernel games
in [27]–[31], for NE seeking problems only, in games with
no coupling constraints. Inspired by work on NE seeking
under partial-decision information, [26], and by the recent
elegant, operator-theoretic approach to GNE problems, [16],
[17], in this paper we consider GNE seeking in games with
affine coupling constraints, under partial-decision and local
information exchange over an arbitrary network.
Literature review: Distributed (variational) GNE
computation is an active research area, but existing results are
for the classical setting of full-decision information. Initial
results were developed based on a variational inequality (VI)
approach, [10], [5]. For (pseudo)-monotone games, [5] adopts
a single-layer Tikhonov regularization primal-dual algorithm,
[6] proposes a primal-dual gradient approach, while [19]
proposes a payoff-based algorithm, all with diminishing
step-sizes. Recently, an operator-splitting approach has
proved to be very powerful; it allows the design of GNE
algorithms that are guaranteed to globally converge with fixed
step-sizes, with concise convergence proofs. Most results
are for aggregative games, [7], [13]–[16]. In [14]–[16],
algorithms are semi-decentralized, requiring a central node
(coordinator) to broadcast the common multipliers and/or
aggregative variables, hence a star topology. This is relaxed in
[13] by combining a continuous-time consensus dynamics and
a projected gradient, still for aggregative games. For games
with generally coupled costs and affine coupling constraints,
distributed and center-free GNE seeking is investigated via
an operator approach in [17], [18], [36]: a forward-backward
algorithm, convergent in strongly monotone games [17],
[36], and preconditioned proximal algorithms for monotone
games [18]. Players communicate the local multipliers over a
network with arbitrary topology, in a distributed, peer-to-peer
manner, but each agent has access to the decisions of all other
agents that influence his cost, hence full-decision information.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this paper
we consider distributed GNE seeking in a partial-decision
information setting via an operator-splitting approach. We
propose a fully distributed GNE seeking algorithm for games
with generally coupled costs and affine coupling constraints,
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2over networks with an arbitrary topology. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first such algorithm in the literature.
Based on a primal-dual analysis of the variational inequality
KKT conditions, we reformulate the problem as that of
finding zeros of a sum of monotone operators and use the
Laplacian matrix to distribute the computations. Different
from [17] (perfect opponents’ decision information), herein
we distribute both the primal and the dual variables. To
account for partial-decision information, we endow each
agent with an auxiliary variable that estimates the other
agents’ decisions (primal variables), as in NE seeking over
networks, [28], [31]. Compared to [17], [36], this introduces
technical challenges, as a change in an estimate induces a
nonlinear change in an agent’s dynamics. We make use of
two selection matrices and we incorporate the Laplacian in
an appropriate manner to do double duty, namely to enforce
consensus of the local decision estimates (primal variables)
and of the local multipliers (dual variables). Compared
to [1], here we relax the assumption of cocoercivity of
the extended pseudo-gradient. Under Lipschitz continuity of
the extended pseudo-gradient, we prove convergence with
fixed step-sizes over any connected graph, by leveraging
monotone operator-splitting techniques, [34]. Specifically, we
reformulate the algorithm as a forward-backward iteration
for doubly-augmented monotone operators, and distribute the
resolvent operation via a doubly-augmented metric matrix.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
notations and preliminary background. Section III formulates
the game. Section IV introduces the distributed GNE seeking
algorithm and reformulates it as an operator-splitting iteration.
The convergence analysis is presented in Section V, numerical
simulations in Section VI and concluding remarks are given
in Section VII. Some of the proofs are placed in the appendix.
II. PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND
Notations. For a vector x ∈ Rm, xT denotes its transpose
and ‖x‖ =
√
xTx the norm induced by inner product
〈·, ·〉. For a symmetric positive-definite matrix Φ, Φ  0,
smin(Φ) and smax(Φ) denote its minimum and maximum
eigenvalues. The Φ-induced inner product is 〈x, y〉Φ = 〈Φx, y〉
and the Φ-induced norm, ‖x‖Φ =
√〈Φx, x〉. For a matrix
A ∈ Rm×n, let ‖A‖ = σmax(A) denote the 2-induced
matrix norm, where σmax(A) is its maximum singular value.
Let 1m = (1, ..., 1)T ∈ Rm and 0m = (0, ..., 0)T ∈ Rm.
For N = {1, ..., N}, col(xi)i∈N or [xi]i∈N denotes the
stacked vector obtained from vectors xi, diag((Ai)i∈N ) the
block diagonal matrix with A1, ..., AN on the main diagonal.
Null(A) and Range(A) are the null and range space of matrix
A, respectively, while [A]ij stands for its (i, j) entry. Im
denotes the identity matrix in Rm×m. Denote ×i=1,...,NΩi or∏N
i=1 Ωi as the Cartesian product of the sets Ωi, i = 1, ..., N .
A. Monotone operators
The following are from [34]. Let A : Rm → 2Rm be a
set-valued operator. The domain of A is domA = {x ∈
Rm|Ax 6= ∅} where ∅ is the empty set, and the range of A is
ranA = {y ∈ Rm|∃x, y ∈ Ax}. The graph of A is graA =
{(x, u) ∈ Rm × Rm|u ∈ Ax}; the inverse of A is defined
through its graph as graA−1 = {(u, x)|(x, u) ∈ graA}. The
zero set of A is zerA = {x ∈ Rm|0 ∈ Ax}. A is called
monotone if ∀(x, u),∀(y, v) ∈ graA, 〈x − y, u − v〉 ≥ 0. It
is maximally monotone if graA is not strictly contained in
the graph of any other monotone operator. The resolvent of
A is JA = (Id + A)−1, where Id is the identity operator.
JA is single-valued and domJA = Rm if A is maximally
monotone. The composition of A and B is denoted by A◦B.
The sum A + B is defined as gra(A + B) = {(x, y +
z)|(x, y) ∈ graA, (x, z) ∈ graB}. If A and B are maximally
monotone operators and 0 ∈ int(domB − domA), then
A + B is also maximally monotone. If B is single-valued,
then zer(A + B) = Fix(JA ◦ (Id − B)), [34, Prop. 25.1],
where FixT denotes the set of fixed points of T .
For a proper lower semi-continuous convex (l.s.c.) function
f , its sub-differential ∂f : domf → 2Rm is x 7→ {g ∈
Rm|f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈g, y − x〉,∀y ∈ domf}. ∂f is a
maximally monotone operator. Proxf = J∂f : Rm → domf ,
Proxf : x 7→ arg minu∈domf f(u)+ 12‖u−x‖2 is the proximal
operator of f . Define the indicator function of Ω as ιΩ(x) = 0
if x ∈ Ω and ιΩ(x) = ∞ if x /∈ Ω. For a closed convex set
Ω, ιΩ is a proper l.s.c. function and ∂ιΩ is the normal cone
operator of Ω, NΩ(x) = {v|〈v, y − x〉 ≤ 0,∀y ∈ Ω}.
An operator T : Ω ⊂ Rm → Rm is nonexpansive if it
is 1−Lipschitz, i.e., ‖T (x) − T (y)‖ ≤ ‖x − y‖,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
T is α−averaged (α ∈ (0, 1)), if there exists a nonexpansive
operator T
′
such that T =(1−α)Id+αT ′ . By [34, Prop. 4.25],
given α ∈ (0, 1), T ∈ A(α), where A(α) denotes the class of
α−averaged operators, if and only if ∀x, y ∈ Ω:
(i): ‖Tx−Ty‖2≤‖x−y‖2− 1−αα ‖(x−y)−(Tx−Ty)‖2.
(ii): ‖Tx−Ty‖2+(1−2α)‖x−y‖2 ≤ 2(1−α)〈x−y, Tx−Ty〉.
If T ∈A( 12 ), T is also called firmly nonexpansive. If A is
maximally monotone, JA=(Id+A)−1 is firmly nonexpasive,
[34, Prop. 23.7]. Let the projection of x onto Ω be PΩ(x) =
arg miny∈Ω ‖x− y‖, withPΩ(x)=ProxιΩ(x)=JNΩ(x). If Ω
is closed and convex, PΩ is firmly nonexpansive since NΩ is
maximally monotone [34, Prop. 4.8]. T is called β−cocoercive
if βT ∈ A( 12 ), for β > 0, i.e., β‖T (x) − T (y)‖2 ≤〈x−y, T (x)−T (y)〉,∀x, y ∈ Ω. If f is convex differentiable,
with θ−Lipschitz gradient ∇f , then ∇f is 1θ−cocoercive (cf.
Baillon-Haddad theorem, [34, Thm. 18.15]).
B. Graph theory
The following are from [35]. Let graph Gc = (N , E)
describe the information exchange among a set N of agents,
where E ⊂N×N is the edge set. If agent i can get information
from agent j, then (j, i) ∈ E and agent j belongs to agent i’s
neighbour set Ni = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}, i /∈ Ni. Gc is undirected
when (i, j) ∈ E if and only if (j, i) ∈ E . Gc is connected
if any two agents are connected. Let W = [wij ] ∈ RN×N
be the weighted adjacency matrix, with wij > 0 if j ∈ Ni
and wij = 0 otherwise, and Deg = diag((di)i∈N ), where
di =
∑N
j=1 wij . Assume W = W
T . The weighted Laplacian
of Gc is L = Deg−W. When Gc is connected and undirected, 0
is a simple eigenvalue of L, L1N = 0N , 1TNL = 0
T
N ; all other
eigenvalues are positive. Let the eigenvalues of L in ascending
order be 0 < s2(L) ≤ ... ≤ sN (L), d∗ ≤ sN (L) ≤ 2d∗, where
d∗ = maxi{di} is the maximal weighted degree.
3III. GAME FORMULATION
Consider a group of agents (players) N = {1, ..., N},
where each player i ∈ N controls its local decision (strategy
or decision) xi ∈ Rni . Denote x = col(xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
as the decision profile, i.e., the stacked vector of all the
agents’ decisions where
∑N
i=1 ni = n. We also write x =
col(xi)i∈N as x = (xi, x−i) where x−i = col(xj)j∈N\{i =
col(..., xi−1, xi+1, ...) denotes the decision profile of all
agents’ decisions except player i. Agent i aims to optimize
its objective function Ji(xi, x−i), coupled to other players’
decisions, with respect to its own decision xi over its
feasible decision set. Let the globally shared, affine coupled
constrained set be
K :=
N∏
i=1
Ωi
⋂
{x ∈ Rn|
N∑
i=1
Aixi ≤
N∑
i=1
bi}. (1)
where Ωi ⊂ Rni is a private feasible set of player i, and
Ai ∈ Rm×ni , bi ∈ Rm its local data. Let Ω =
∏N
i=1 Ωi. A
jointly-convex game with coupled constraints is represented
by the set of inter-dependent optimization problems
∀i ∈ N , min
xi∈Rni
Ji(xi, x−i) s.t. xi ∈ Ki(x−i). (2)
where Ki(x−i) := {xi ∈ Rni : (xi, x−i) ∈ K} is the feasible
decision set of agent i. A generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) of game (2), (1) is a profile x∗ = col(x∗i )i∈N at the
intersection of all best-response sets,
x∗i ∈ arg minJi(xi, x∗−i) s.t. xi ∈ Ki(x∗−i),∀i ∈ N . (3)
Assumption 1: For each player i, Ji(xi, x−i) is continuously
differentiable and convex in xi, given x−i, and Ωi is
non-empty compact and convex. K is non-empty and satisfies
Slater’s constraint qualification.
Denote A = [A1, ..., AN ] and b =
∑N
i=1 bi. Suppose x
∗ is
a GNE of game (2), (1) then for agent i, x∗i is the optimal
solution to the following convex optimization problem:
min
xi∈Rni
Ji(xi, x
∗
−i), s.t. xi ∈ Ωi, Aixi ≤ b−
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Ajx
∗
j .
(4)
A primal-dual characterization can be obtained via a
Lagrangian for each agent i,
Li(xi, λi;x−i) = Ji(xi, x−i) + λTi (Ax− b). (5)
with dual variable (multiplier) λi ∈ Rm+ . When x∗i is an
optimal solution to (4), there exists λ∗i ∈ Rm+ such that the
following KKT conditions are satisfied:
0ni = ∇xiLi(x∗i , λ∗i ;x∗−i), x∗i ∈ Ωi, i ∈ N
〈λ∗i , Ax∗ − b〉 = 0, −(Ax∗ − b) ≥ 0, λ∗i ≥ 0, (6)
Equivalently, using the normal cone operator,
0ni ∈ ∇xiJi(x∗i , x∗−i) +ATi λ∗i +NΩi(x∗i ), i ∈ N
0m ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) +NRm+ (λ∗i )
(7)
Denote λ = col(λi)i∈N . By [10, Thm. 8, §4] when (x∗,λ∗)
satisfies KKT conditions (7), x∗ is a GNE of game (2), (1).
A GNE with the same Lagrangian multipliers for all the
agents is called variational GNE, [10], which has the economic
interpretation of no price discrimination, [32]. A variational
GNE of game (2), (1) is defined as x∗ ∈ K solution of the
following V I(F,K):
〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K, (8)
where F is the pseudo-gradient of the game defined as:
F (x) = col(∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈N . (9)
x∗ solves V I(F,K) if and only if there exists a λ∗ ∈ Rm
such that the KKT conditions are satisfied, [33, §10.1],
0n ∈ F (x∗) +ATλ∗ +NΩ(x∗)
0m ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) +NRm+ (λ∗)
(10)
where NΩ(x∗) =
∏N
i=1NΩi(x
∗
i ), or component-wise,
0ni ∈ ∇xiJi(x∗i , x∗−i) +ATi λ∗ +NΩi(x∗i ), i ∈ N
0m ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) +NRm+ (λ∗).
Assumption 1 guarantees existence of a solution to V I(F,K)
(8), by [33, Cor. 2.2.5]. By [10, Thm. 9, §4], every solution
x∗ of V I(F,K) (8) is a GNE of game (2). Furthermore, if
x∗ together with λ∗ satisfies the KKT conditions (10) for
V I(F,K) (8), then x∗ satisfies the KKT conditions (7) with
λ∗1 = ...=λ
∗
N =λ
∗, hence x∗ is variational GNE of game (2).
Our aim is to design an iterative algorithm that finds
a variational GNE under partial-decision information over
a network with arbitrary topology Gc, by using an
operator-theoretic approach. We first review typical iterative
algorithms under full-decision information, where each agent
has access to the others’ decisions.
A. Iterative Algorithm under Full-Decision Information
Assumption 2: F is strongly monotone and Lipschitz
continuous: there exists µ > 0 and θ0 > 0 such that for any
pair of points x and x′, 〈x−x′, F (x)−F (x′)〉 ≥ µ‖x−x′‖2
and ‖F (x)− F (x′)‖ ≤ θ0‖x− x′‖.
Strong monotonicity of F is a standard assumption under
which convergence of projected-gradient type algorithms is
guaranteed with fixed step-sizes, e.g. [6], [7], [17], [16].
Under Assumption 1, 2, the V I(F,K), (8), has a unique
solution x∗ (cf. [33, Thm. 2.3.3]), thus the game (2) has a
unique variational GNE. Assuming each player has access
to the others’ decisions x−i, i.e., full-decision information, a
primal-dual projected-gradient GNE algorithm is
xi,k+1 = PΩi
(
xi,k − τ(∇xiJi(xi,k, x−i,k) +ATi λk)
)
λk+1 = PRm+
(
λk + σ
(
A(2xk+1 − xk)− b
))
, (11)
where xi,k, λk denote xi, λ at iteration k and τ and σ are
fixed step-sizes. The dual variable λ is handled by a center
(coordinator) as in [16] hence (11) is semi-decentralized.
Algorithm (11) is an instance of an operator-splitting
method for finding zeros of a sum of monotone operators,
[34, §25]. To see this, note that the KKT conditions (10) can
be written as col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zerT where the operator T is
defined by the concatenated right-hand side of (10). T can be
split as A+B, where operators A, B are defined as
A :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x)
NRm+ (λ)
]
+
[
0 AT
−A 0
] [
x
λ
]
B :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
F (x)
b
]
(12)
4Algorithm (11) can be obtained as a forward-backward
iteration, [34, §25.3], for zeros of Φ−1A + Φ−1B, where
Φ =
[
τ−1 −AT
−A σ−1
]
is a metric matrix. We note that
different GNE seeking algorithms can be obtained for different
splitting of T , with convergence conditions dependent on
monotonicity properties of A and B. Notice that A (12) is
maximally monotone (similar arguments for this can be found
in Lemma 4), and under Assumption 2, B is cocoercive.
Convergence of (11) to x∗, λ∗ can be proved for sufficient
conditions on the fixed-step sizes such that Φ  0.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM UNDER
PARTIAL-DECISION INFORMATION
In this section we consider a partial-decision information
setting, where the agents do not have full information on the
others’ decisions x−i. We propose an algorithm that allows
agents to find a variational GNE based on local information
exchange with neighbours, over a communication graph Gc
with arbitrary topology, under the following assumption.
Assumption 3: Gc is undirected and connected.
Our approach is based on the interpretation of the
KKT conditions (10) as a zero-finding problem of a sum
of operators. To deal with (incomplete) partial-decision
information and to distribute the computations, we introduce
estimates and lift the original problem to a higher-dimensional
space. This space (called the augmented space), is
doubly-augmented (in both primal and dual variables), and
the original space is its consensus subspace. We appropriately
define a pair of doubly-augmented operators, such that any
zero of their sum lies on the consensus subspace, and has
variational GNE x∗ and λ∗ as its components.
We describe next the algorithm variables. Agent i controls
its local decision xi ∈ Rni , and a local copy of multiplier
(dual variable) λi ∈ Rm+ for the estimation of λ∗ in (10). To
cope with partial-decision information, we endow each player
with an auxiliary variable xi that provides an estimate of other
agents’ primal variables (decisions), as done in [28], [31] for
NE seeking. Thus agent i maintains xi = col(xij)j∈N ∈ Rn,
where xij is player i’s estimate of player j’s decision and
xii = xi is its decision. Note that x
i = (xi,x
i
−i), where x
i
−i
represents player i’s estimate vector without its own decision
xi. In steady-state all estimates should be equal, i.e., xi =
xj and λi = λj . Each agent uses the relative feedback from
its neighbours such that in steady-state these estimates, on
both primal and dual variables, agree one with another. An
additional local auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm is used for the
coordination needed to satisfy the coupling constraint and to
reach consensus of the local multipliers (dual variables) λi.
Agents exchange local {xi, λi, zi} via the arbitrary topology
communication graph Gc = {N , E}. (j, i) ∈ E if player i
can receive {xj , λj , zj} from player j ∈ Ni, where Ni =
{j|(j, i) ∈ E} denotes its set of neighbours.
The distributed algorithm for player i is given as follows.
Algorithm 1:
Initialize: xi,0∈ Ωi, xi−i,0∈Rn−ni , λi,0∈Rm+ , zi,0∈Rm.
Iteration:
xi,k+1 = PΩi
(
xi,k − τi
(∇xiJi(xi,k,xi−i,k) +ATi λi,k
+c
∑
j∈Ni wij(xi,k − x
j
i,k)
))
xi−i,k+1 = x
i
−i,k − τic
∑
j∈Ni wij
(
xi−i,k − xj−i,k
)
zi,k+1 = zi,k + νi
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi,k − λj,k)
λi,k+1 = PRm+
(
λi,k + σi
(
Ai(2xi,k+1 − xi,k)− bi
−∑j∈Ni wij(2(zi,k+1 − zj,k+1)− (zi,k − zj,k))
−∑j∈Ni wij(λi,k − λj,k)))
Here xi,k, xi−i,k, zi,k,λi,k denote xi, x
i
−i, zi, λi at iteration k,
c>0 is a design parameter, τi,νi,σi>0 are fixed step-sizes of
player i, and W = [wij ] the weighted adjacency matrix of Gc.
Remark 1: The update for xi in Algorithm 1 employs a
projected-gradient descent of the local Lagrangian function
in (5) with an extra proportional term of the consensual
errors (disagreement) between his primal variables and his
neighbours’ estimates. The updates for xi−i and zi can be
regarded as discrete-time integrations for the consensual errors
of local decision estimates and dual variables. Finally, λi is
updated by a combination of the projected-gradient ascent
of local Lagrangian (5) and a proportional-integral term for
consensual errors. Each player knows only its local data in
game (2), Ji, Ωi, Ai and bi, own private information, i.e.,
cost function, preference and decision ability. Ai characterizes
how agent i is involved in the coupled constraint (shares the
global resource), assumed to be privately known by player i.
The globally shared constraint Ax ≤ b couples the agents’
feasible decision sets, but is not known by any agent.
Remark 2: Compared to algorithm (11), Algorithm 1 is
completely distributed (without any central coordinator), i.e.,
primal-distributed and dual-distributed over Gc. The algorithms
in [17], [31] are special cases of Algorithm 1. When each
agent has access to all players’ decisions that affect its cost,
the estimates xi−i are not needed (set c= 0), and Algorithm
1 reduces to the dual-distributed, perfect-information case one
in [17] (dual distributed). On the other hand, in a game with
no coupling constraints (set A= 0, b= 0), the λi (hence the
zi) are not needed, and Algorithm 1 reduces to a discrete-time
version of the primal-distributed dynamics in [31].
Next, we write Algorithm 1 in compact form, using two
matrices to manipulate the selection of agent i’s decision
variables, xi, and estimate variables, xi−i. Let
Ri =
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
(13)
Si =
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
(14)
where n<i =
∑
j<i j∈N nj , n>i =
∑
j>i j∈N nj . Hence
Ri selects the i-th ni-dimensional component from an
n-dimensional vector, while Si removes it. Thus, Ri xi=xii=
xi and Si xi = xi−i. With xi = Ri xi, the stacked decisions
x = col(xi)i∈N ∈ Rn can be written as x = Rx, where
R= diag((Ri)i∈N ) and x = col(xi)i∈N ∈ RNn. Similarly,
the stacked estimates are col(xi−i)i∈N = Sx ∈ R(N−1)n,
5where S = diag((Si)i∈N ). These two matrices, R and S,
play a key role in the following. Using (13), it can be seen
that both are full row rank and moreover,
RTR+ STS = INn,
RST = 0n, SRT = 0Nn−n (15)
RRT = In, SST = INn−n.
Furthermore, with v := Sx, we can write x = RTx + STv.
With these notations, we write Algorithm 1 in stacked form,
using boldface notation for stacked variables (all local copies).
Lemma 1: Let xk = col(xi,k)i∈N , xk = col(xik)i∈N ,
λk = col(λi,k)i∈N , zk = col(zi,k)i∈N . Then, Algorithm 1 is
equivalently written in stacked notation as
xk+1 = PΩ
(
xk − τx(F(xk) +ATλk + cRLx xk)
)
(16)
Sxk+1 = Sxk − τs cSLx xk (17)
zk+1 = zk + νLλ λk (18)
λk+1 = PRNm+
(
λk + σ(A(2xk+1 − xk)− b (19)
− Lλ λk − Lλ (2zk+1 − zk))
)
where F is defined as
F(x) = col(∇xiJi(xi,xi−i))i∈N , (20)
A= diag((Ai)i∈N,b= col(bi)i∈N, Lx= L⊗In, Lλ= L⊗Im,
R= diag((Ri)i∈N), S = diag((Si)i∈N), τx=diag(τiIni)i∈N,
τs=diag(τiIn−ni)i∈N), ν=diag(νiIm)i∈N,σ=diag(σiIm)i∈N.
2
Remark 3: In Algorithm 1, instead of evaluating its gradient
at actual decisions, as in ∇xiJi(xi, x−i), each player evaluates
its gradient at local estimates, ∇xiJi(xi,xi−i). The stacked
form F(x), (20), called the extended pseudo-gradient, is the
extension of F , (9) to the augmented space of decisions and
estimates. When these estimates are identical, xi = x for all
i, then F(1N ⊗ x) = F (x).
Based on Lemma 1, we show next that Algorithm 1 can
be written as a forward-backward iteration for finding zeros
of the sum of two doubly-augmented operators Φ−1A and
Φ−1B, where A, B are related to A, B, (12), and Φ is a
(preconditioning) metric matrix. Let $ = col(x, z,λ) ∈ Ω,
where Ω :=RNn×RNm×RNm+ . Define A : Ω→ 2R
Nn+2Nm
,
B : Ω→ RNn+2Nm as
A : $ 7→
RTNΩ(Rx)0
NRNm+ (λ)
+
 0 0 RTAT0 0 −Lλ
−AR Lλ 0
$
B : $ 7→
 RTF(x) + cLxx0
Lλ λ+ b
 (21)
where NΩ(Rx) = NΩ(x) =
∏N
i=1NΩi(xi), RTNΩ(Rx) =
{RT v |v ∈ NΩ(Rx)}, NRNm+ (λ) =
∏N
i=1NRm+ (λi).
Let the matrix Φ be defined as
Φ =
 τ−1 0 −RTAT0 ν−1 Lλ
−AR Lλ σ−1
 . (22)
where τ = diag((τiIn)i∈N ), τ−1 = diag((τ−1i In)i∈N ), and
ν−1,σ−1 are similarly defined from ν,σ.
Lemma 2: Let $k = col(xk, zk,λk), A, B, Φ as in (21),
(22). Suppose that Φ 0 and Φ−1A is maximally monotone.
Then the following hold:
(i): Algorithm 1 is equivalent to
−B($k) ∈ A($k+1) + Φ($k+1 −$k), (23)
or, $k+1 =(Id+Φ−1A)−1◦(Id−Φ−1B)$k :=T2◦T1$k, (24)
where T1 := Id− Φ−1B and T2 := (Id + Φ−1A)−1.
(ii): Any limit point $ = col(x, z,λ) of Algorithm 1 is a zero
of A+B and a fixed point of T2 ◦ T1.
2
Remark 4: Algorithm 1, written as (24) is a
forward-backward iteration for finding zeros of
Φ−1A + Φ−1B, or fixed-point iteration for T2 ◦ T1 [34,
§25.3]. It alternates a forward step (Id − Φ−1B), and a
backward step (Id + Φ−1A)−1. Typically, the backward
step evaluates the resolvent of a monotone operator, while
the forward step evaluates a cocoercive operator. Note
that we put the skew-symmetric part (monotone but not
cocoercive) in A, (21), and F, Lx and Lλ in B. This
separation between constraint data and game cost functions
data will be instrumental later on to study monotonicity and
cocoercivity properties of the two operators. Note that with
the standard choice Φ = I , the resolvent (Id + A)−1 needs
evaluated, which cannot be done in a distributed manner.
This is where a non-identity metric matrix Φ as in (22)
helps. Specifically, for A (21), let A = A1 +A2, where
A1 = RTNΩR(x) × 0Nm × NRNm+ (λ) and A2 is the
skew-symmetric matrix in (21). Then, with Φ as in (22), (23)
is written as −B($k) ∈ A1($k+1)+(A2 +Φ)$k+1−Φ$k,
where A2 + Φ =
 τ−1 0 00 ν−1 0
−2AR 2Lλ σ−1
. Since this is
lower block-triangular, the resolvent can be evaluated
distributively via only projection, matrix multiplying and
local communication. Using PRNm+ (λ) = (Id+NRNm+ )
−1, it
can be checked that the explicit iterations are as in (16)-(19).
Remark 5: Operators A, B, (21), are doubly-augmented
extensions of A, B, (12), obtained by introducing local copies
of primal and dual variables, from x ∈ Rn to x = [xi]i∈N ∈
RNn, λ ∈ Rm to λ = [λi]i∈N ∈ RNm and with auxiliary
variables z = [zi]i∈N ∈ RNm. The Laplacian matrices Lx
and Lλ help to enforce the consensus of the local primal
variables xi and of the local dual multipliers λi, as well as
the feasibility of the affine coupling constraints. The auxiliary
variables zi help for the consensus of λis and to decouple the
constraint, in the sense of estimating the contribution of the
other agents in the constraint. Note that if we set R=I , Lx=
0, x=1N⊗x then F(1N⊗x)=F (x) and A and B collapse
to the operators A and B in [17], distributed in dual variables
only. Furthermore, if we also set Lλ = 0 and take λ = 1N⊗λ,
matrix A reduces to A, and we recover operators A and
B, (12). Extension to the partial-decision information case
introduces technical challenges in the convergence analysis:
coupling in F (augmented space), non-square R, and the extra
term involving Lx. We will exploit properties of these extra
terms to derive properties for the doubly-extended operators
A and B.
6V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1.
First, in Theorem 1, based on the fact that any limiting point of
Algorithm 1 is a zero ofA+B (Lemma 2(ii)), we characterize
the zeros ofA+B. We show that any zero is on the consensus
subspace and solves the V I(F,K) (8), thus any limiting point
of Algorithm 1 finds a variational GNE of game (2).
Let Ex= {x ∈ RNn|xi = xj ,∀i, j ∈ N} = {x = 1N ⊗
x, x ∈ Rn} denote the estimate consensus subspace, E⊥x its
orthogonal complement with RNn = Ex ⊕ E⊥x , Eλ= {λ ∈
RNm|λ=1N⊗λ, λ∈Rm} the multiplier consensus subspace.
Consider Lx= L⊗ In, Lλ= L⊗ Im. Under Assumption 3
on Gc, Null(Lx) = Range{1N ⊗ In}= Ex, Range(Lx) =
Null(Lx)
⊥=Null{1TN⊗In}=E⊥x , Null(Lλ)=Range{1N⊗
Im}=Eλ, Range(Lλ)=Null{1TN⊗Im}.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Consider
operators A,B, (21). Then the following statements hold.
(i): Given any $∗ :=col(x∗,z∗,λ∗)∈zer(A+B), then x∗∈Ex
and λ∗∈Eλ, with x∗=1N⊗x∗ and λ∗=1N⊗λ∗, where x∗,
λ∗ satisfy the KKT conditions (10), col(x∗, λ∗)∈zer(A+B),
for A, B, (12). Moreover, x∗ solves the V I(F,K) (8), hence
x∗ is a variational GNE of game (2). (ii): zer(A+B) 6= ∅.
Proof: (i) Let $∗ := col(x∗,z∗,λ∗)∈zer(A+B). By (21),
0Nn ∈ RTF(x∗) + cLxx∗ +RTATλ∗ +RTNΩ(Rx∗)
0Nm = −Lλλ∗ (25)
0Nm ∈ Lλλ∗ + b+NRNm+ (λ
∗)−ARx∗ + Lλz∗
From the first line it follows that for some v ∈ NΩ(Rx∗)
0Nn = RT
[
F(x∗) +ATλ∗ + v
]
+ cLxx
∗ (26)
From the second line of (25) it follows that λ∗ ∈ Null(Lλ)=
Eλ, hence λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, for some λ∗ ∈ Rm. Note that
(1TN ⊗ In)RT = In (by (13)) and (1TN ⊗ In)Lx = 0n×Nn.
The, premultiplying (26) by (1TN ⊗ In) yields
0n = F(x
∗) +ATλ∗ + v (27)
Substituting (27) into (26) yields 0Nn = Lxx∗. Thus, x∗ ∈
Null(Lx) = Ex (by Assumption 3), and x∗ = 1N ⊗x∗, for
some x∗∈Rn. Using x∗=1N⊗x∗ and λ∗=1N⊗λ∗ in (27)
yields 0n=F(1N⊗x∗)+AT (1N⊗λ∗)+v for v ∈ NΩ(Rx∗),
or 0n ∈ F(1N⊗x∗)+AT (1N⊗λ∗)+NΩ(x∗). With F(1N⊗
x∗) = F (x∗), AT (1N ⊗ λ∗) = ATλ∗, this is equivalent to
0n ∈ F (x∗)+ATλ∗+NΩ(x∗), which is the first line in (10).
Using x∗=1N⊗x∗, λ∗=1N⊗λ∗, Lλλ∗=0Nm in the third
line of (25), yields 0Nm ∈ b+NRNm+ (1N ⊗λ∗)−AR(1N ⊗
x∗) + Lλz∗. Thus, with R(1N⊗x∗)=x∗,
0Nm = b+ col(wi)i∈N −Ax∗ + Lλz∗. (28)
for some wi ∈ NRm+ (λ∗), i ∈ N . Premultiplying (28) by
(1TN ⊗Im), with (1TN ⊗Im)Lλ = 0m×Nm, (1TN ⊗Im)A = A,
yields that 0m =
∑N
i=1 bi +
∑N
i=1 wi − Ax∗, or, 0m ∈
b+
∑N
i=1NRm+ (λ
∗)−Ax∗. This gives the second line in (10),
using N⋂N
i=1 Si =
∑N
i=1NSi if
⋂N
i=1 int(Si) 6= ∅, [34, Cor.
16.39]. Thus, the KKT conditions (10) for V I(F,K) (8) are
satisfied for x∗ and λ∗, col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+B), hence x∗
is a variational GNE of game (2).
(ii) Under Assumption 1 and 2, V I(F,K) (8) has a unique
solution x∗, [33, Thm. 2.3.3], hence there exists λ∗∈Rm such
that (10) holds, [33, Prop. 1.2.1], col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+B).
The first two lines in (25) are satisfied with x∗ = 1N ⊗x∗
and λ∗ = 1N ⊗λ∗. Using (10) it can be shown that ∃z∗ ∈
RNm such that the third line in (25) is also satisfied, hence
zer(A+B) 6=∅. This is omitted due to space constraints (see
the proof of [36, Thm. 1] for similar arguments). 2
Note that (25) can be regarded as the KKT conditions (10),
doubly-augmented in both the primal and the dual space using
local variables, x, λ, and auxiliary variables z.
Next we focus on proving the convergence of Algorithm
1, based on its interpretation as a forward-backward iteration
for zeros of Φ−1A + Φ−1B, or a fixed-point iteration of
T2◦T1 (see (24), Lemma 2). This is done in Theorem 2, using
nonexpansiveness properties of T1 and T2, obtained in Lemma
6 from properties of Φ−1A and Φ−1B. These are based on
monotonicity properties of A and B (Lemma 4), under a
sufficient condition for Φ to be positive definite (Lemma 5). To
prove Lemma 6 and 4, a key result is Lemma 3, which shows
how a restricted monotonicity property can be achieved in the
augmented space under Lipschitz continuity of F.
Assumption 4: The extended pseudo-gradient F, (20), is
Lipschitz continuous: there exists θ > 0 such that for any x
and x′, ‖F(x)− F(x′))‖ ≤ θ‖x− x′‖.
Remark 6: Note that Assumption 4 on F is weaker
than those in [28]–[30], [1]. In the classical, full-decision
information setting, convergence proof relies on cocoercivity
(strong monotonicity) of F , e.g. [17]. Cocoercivity of F
(the extension of cocoercivity of F to the augmented
space), is sometimes used in works on NE computation in
partial-decision information setting, [28]–[30], [1]. Unlike
distributed optimization, where cocoercivity is automatically
satisfied, in a game context, monotonicity of F is not
automatically satisfied in the augmented space, because
of coupling to the others’ actions and because of partial
convexity. It does hold in games with shared coupling
constraints but separable costs. We show next how, in generally
coupled games, under Assumption 4, a restricted monotonicity
property can be achieved in the augmented space.
Lemma 3: Consider that Assumptions 1-4 hold and let
Ψ =
[
µ
N − θ+θ02√N
− θ+θ0
2
√
N
c s2(L)− θ
]
(29)
Then, for any c > cmin, where cmin s2(L) =
(θ+θ0)
2
4µ + θ,
Ψ  0 and, for any x and any x′ ∈ Ex,
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))≥ µ¯‖x−x′‖2, (30)
where µ¯ := smin(Ψ) > 0 and Ex = Null(Lx) is the n-
dimensional consensus subspace. 2
Remark 7: Lemma 3 is instrumental to show global
convergence of Algorithm 1 under Assumption 4. In Section
VI we consider a quadratic game example and check
analytically Assumption 4.
Property (30) in Lemma 3 means that, for a sufficiently
large c>0, RTF+ cLx is µ¯-strongly monotone in a restricted
set of directions (since x′ ∈ Ex), which we call µ¯-restricted
strongly monotone. This is a weaker monotonicity property,
similar to the notion of restricted convexity used in DOP,
[38], and high-dimensional statistical estimation, [39]. To show
7this key property, an instrumental step is the decomposition
of the augmented space RNn = Ex⊕E⊥x into the consensus
subspace Ex = Null(Lx) (where F is strongly monotone),
and its orthogonal complement E⊥ = Null(Lx)⊥ (where
Lx is strongly monotone), (see proof in Appendix). Based
on this property, we show in Lemma 4 that the operator B
is restricted cocoercive, which is sufficient to prove global
convergence of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 4: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold and c is selected
such that c > cmin, with cmin as in Lemma 3. Then the
following hold for operators A and B, (21).
(i): A is maximally monotone.
(ii):B is β-restricted cocoercive: for any $ and any $′∈ ΩE ,
where ΩE=Ex×RNm×RNm+ , the following holds,
〈$ −$′,B$ −B$′〉 ≥ β‖B$ −B$′‖2 (31)
where β ∈ (0,min{ µ¯
θ¯2
, 12d∗ }], θ¯ = θ + 2cd∗, µ¯ = smin(Ψ), Ψ
as in (29) and d∗ is the maximal weighted degree of Gc.
2
The next result follows from Lemma 3 in [17]) and
Gershgorin’s theorem.
Lemma 5: Consider Φ, (22). Given any δ > 0, if each player
choose step-sizes τi, νi, σi in Algorithm 1 such that
0 < τi ≤ (maxj=1,...ni{
∑m
k=1 |[ATi ]jk|}+ δ)−1,
0 < σi ≤ (maxj=1,...m{
∑ni
k=1 |[Ai]jk|}+ 2di + δ)−1
0 < νi ≤ (2di + δ)−1
(32)
then Φ  0 and Φ− δIn+2Nm  0.
2
The next result gives properties of Φ−1A and Φ−1B under
the Φ−induced norm ‖·‖Φ.
Lemma 6: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Take any c such
that c > cmin, with cmin as in Lemma 3, and any δ > 12β ,
where β ∈ (0,min{ µ¯
θ¯2
, 12d∗ }], θ¯ = θ + 2cd∗, µ¯ = smin(Ψ),
Ψ as in (29) and d∗ is the maximal weighted degree of Gc.
Suppose that the step-sizes τi, νi, σi in Algorithm 1 are chosen
to satisfy (32). Then, the following hold for the operators
Φ−1A, Φ−1B and T1 = Id−Φ−1B, T2 = (Id + Φ−1A)−1,
under the Φ-induced norm ‖·‖Φ, with Φ as in (22).
(i) Φ−1A is maximally monotone and T2 ∈ A( 12 ).
(ii) Φ−1B is βδ-restricted cocoercive and T1 is restricted
nonexpansive, such that for any $ and any $′ ∈ ΩE ,
‖T1$−T1$′‖2Φ ≤‖$ −$′‖2Φ
−(2βδ − 1)‖$ −$′ − (T1$ − T1$′) ‖2Φ (33)
2
The next result shows the convergence of Algorithm 1 based
on its compact reformulation (24) and properties of T1, T2.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Take any c such
that c > cmin, with cmin as in Lemma 3, and any δ > 12β ,
where β ∈ (0,min{ µ¯
θ¯2
, 12d∗ }], θ¯ = θ + 2cd∗, µ¯ = smin(Ψ),
Ψ as in (29) and d∗ is the maximal weighted degree of Gc.
If step-sizes τi, νi, σi in Algorithm 1 are chosen satisfy (32),
then, for each player i its {xik}k∈N converges to the same
value x∗ variational GNE of game (2), and its local decision
xi,k = x
i
i,k converges to the corresponding component in x
∗,
while the local multiplier λi,k of all agents converge to the
same multiplier corresponding to the KKT condition (10), i.e.,
limk→∞ xi,k = x∗i , limk→∞ λi,k = λ
∗, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof:
By Lemma 5, Φ  0, and by Lemma 6, Φ−1A is maximally
monotone and Φ−1B is restricted βδ−cocoercive. By Lemma
2(ii), Algorithm 1 can be written in the compact form (24),
fixed-point iteration $k+1 = T2 ◦ T1$k. Consider any $∗ ∈
zer(A+B), or equivalently any fixed point of T2 ◦ T1, i.e.,
$∗ = T2T1$∗. By Lemma 2 and (24) it follows that
‖$k+1 −$∗‖Φ = ‖T2(T1$k)− T2(T1$∗)‖Φ
≤ ‖T1$k − T1$∗‖ ≤ ‖$k −$∗‖Φ (34)
where the first inequality follows from T2 being nonexpansive
(by Lemma 6(i)), and the second one from (33), Lemma 6(ii),
since $∗∈ΩE (cf. Theorem 1(i)) and 2βδ>1 by assumption.
Hence the sequence {‖$k − $∗‖Φ} is non-increasing and
bounded from below. By the monotonic convergence theorem
and since Φ  0, {‖$k−$∗‖} is bounded and converges for
every $∗ ∈ zer(A+B).
Denote ξ = 12δβ ∈ (0, 1). Using again (24), we can write
‖$k+1 −$∗‖2Φ = ‖T2(T1$k)− T2(T1$∗)‖2Φ
≤ ‖T1$k − T1$∗‖2Φ
−‖(T1$k − T1$∗)− (T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)‖2Φ
≤ ‖$k −$∗‖2Φ
−‖(T1$k − T1$∗)− (T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)‖2Φ
− 1−ξξ ‖$k −$∗ − (T1$k − T1$∗)‖2Φ
(35)
where the first inequality follows by [34, Prop. 4.25(i)] for
T2 ∈ A( 12 ), and the second one from (33), Lemma 6(ii), for
T1 with 2δβ= 1/ξ. Next, we use, (cf. [34, Cor. 2.14]),
α‖x‖2 +(1−α)‖y‖2 = ‖αx+(1−α)y‖2 +α(1−α)‖x−y‖2.
(36)
For the second and third terms on the right hand side of (35),
ξ‖(T1$k − T1$∗)− (T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)‖2Φ
+ 1−ξξ ‖$k −$∗ − (T1$k − T1$∗)‖2Φ
= ‖(T1$k − T1$∗)− ξ(T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)
−(1− ξ)($k −$∗)‖2Φ
+ξ(1− ξ)‖(T1$k − T1$∗)− (T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)
−(T1$k − T1$∗) + ($k −$∗)‖2Φ
≥ ξ(1− ξ)‖($k −$∗)− (T2T1$k − T2T1$∗)‖2Φ
= ξ(1− ξ)‖$k − T2T1$k‖2Φ
= ξ(1− ξ)‖$k −$k+1‖2Φ
(37)
where the first equality follows from (36) by setting α = ξ,
x = (T1$k−T1$∗)−(T2T1$k−T2T1$∗) and y = (T1$k−
T1$
∗)− ($k−$∗). Combining (35) and (37) yields ∀k ≥ 0,
‖$k+1−$∗‖2Φ ≤ ‖$k−$∗‖2Φ−(1−ξ)‖$k−$k+1‖2Φ. (38)
Using (38) from 0 to k and adding all k+1 inequalities yields
‖$k+1−$∗‖2Φ ≤ ‖$0−$∗‖2Φ− (1− ξ)
k∑
l=0
‖$l−$l+1‖2Φ.
(39)
Taking limit as k →∞ we have,
(1− ξ)
∞∑
k=1
‖$k −$k+1‖2Φ ≤ ‖$0 −$∗‖2Φ
Since 1 − ξ > 0, it follows that ∑∞k=1 ‖$k − $k+1‖2Φ
converges and limk→∞$k −$k+1 = 0 (since Φ  0).
Since {‖$k − $∗‖} is bounded and converges, {$k} is a
8bounded sequence. Thus, there exists a subsequence{$nk}
that converges to some $∗. Note that T2 ◦ T1 is continuous
and single-valued, because (24) is just an equivalent form
of Algorithm 1, and the right hand side of Algorithm 1 is
continuous. Since $nk+1 = T2T1$nk and T2T1 is continuous,
and since limnk→∞$nk −$nk+1 = 0, passing to limit point,
we have $∗ = T2T1$∗. Therefore, the limit point $∗ is a
fixed point of T2T1, or equivalently, $∗ ∈ zer(A + B).
Setting $∗ = $∗ in (34), it follows that {‖$k − $∗‖}
is bounded and converges. Since there exists a subsequence
{$nk} that converges to $∗, it follows that {‖$k − $∗‖}
converges to zero. Therefore, limk→∞$k → $∗ as k →∞.
Furthermore, by Lemma 2(ii), this $∗ := col(x∗, z∗,λ∗)
satisfies col(x∗, z∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A +B). Invoking Theorem
1(i) concludes the proof. 2
Remark 8: Note that, since Φ−1A is maximally monotone,
convergence of Algorithm 1 could be proved using a simpler
argument, based on [34, Thm. 25.8], once Φ−1B is shown to
be cocoercive (fully, not only restricted). Such an argument
is used in [1] (for c=1), under a cocoercivity assumption for
RTF. Here we do not use any monotonicity assumption on
RTF, but rather only Lipschitz continuity of F. under which
only restricted cocercivity of Φ−1B is guaranteed. Thus, we
cannot directly apply [34, Thm. 25.8]. Instead, our elementary
proof exploits restricted nonexpansiveness properties of T1.
We note that the assumptions on F and F could be relaxed to
hold only locally around x∗ and x∗, in which case all results
become local. We also note that the class of quadratic games
satisfies all assumptions globally. Given a globally known
parameter δ, each agent can independently choose its local step
sizes τi, νi, and σi with the rule in (32), such that Φ in (22) is
positive definite. In the case of uniform player step-sizes the
step-size bound in (32) simplifies to τ ≤ (‖A Lλ‖+ δ)−1.
The bounds in (32) and Theorem 2 recover those in [17] (set
c=0) and those in [1] (set c = 1).
VI. NASH-COURNOT GAME OVER A NETWORK
In this section we consider a Nash-Cournot game over a
network, as in [26], [22], generalized by introducing additional
market capacities constraints or equivalently globally shared
coupling affine constraints. This type of network Cournot
game appeared also in the numerical studies of [40]
(penalty-based algorithm, reaching a region near the pure
penalized NE), and [17] (dual-distributed algorithm), both
assuming perfect opponents’ decision information. Other
practical decision problems in engineering networks can
be described by a Nash-Cournot game over a network,
e.g. rate control games in communication networks [5],
demand-response games in smart-grid networks [30].
Consider a set of N firms (players/agents) involved in the
production of a homogeneous commodity that compete over m
markets, M1, · · · ,Mm (Figure 1). Firm i, i ∈ N participates
in the competition in ni markets by deciding to produce and
deliver xi ∈ Rni amount of products to the markets it connects
with. Its production is limited as xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rni . Firm i
has a local matrix Ai ∈ Rm×ni (with elements 1 or 0) that
specifies which markets it participates in. The j-th column of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
M1
M2
M3
M4 M5
M6
M7
Fig. 1. Network Nash-Cournot game: An edge from i to Mk on this graph
implies that agent/firm i participates in Market Mk .
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Fig. 2. Communication graph Gc: Firms i and j are able to exchange their
local xi and xj if there exists an edge between them on this graph.
Ai, [Ai]:j has its k-th element as 1 if and only if player i
delivers [xi]j amount of production to market Mk; all other
elements are 0. Therefore, A1, · · · , AN can be used to specify
a bipartite graph that represents the connections between
firms and markets (see Figure 1). Denote n =
∑N
i=1 ni,
x = [xi]i∈N ∈ Rn, and A = [A1, · · · , AN ] ∈ Rm×n. Then
Ax ∈ Rm = ∑Ni=1Aixi is the total product supply to all
markets, given the action profile x of all firms. Each market
Mk has a maximal capacity rk > 0, so that Ax ≤ r, where
r = [rk]k=1,...,m ∈ Rm, should be satisfied; we consider
bi =
1
N r. Suppose that P : R
m → Rm is a price vector
function that maps the total supply of each market to the
corresponding market’s price. Each firm has a local production
cost ci(xi) : Ωi → R. Then the local objective function of
company (player) i is Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi) − PT (Ax)Aixi,
dependent on the other firms’ production profile x−i.
In the classical, centralized-information setting each firm
is assumed to have instantaneous access to the others’
actions x−i. This may be impractical in a large network of
geographically distributed firms, [22]. For example, consider
that Figure 1 depicts a group of N = 20 firms located in
different continents that participate in m = 7 markets, with
no centralized communication system between them. Since
players are unable to directly observe the actions of all others,
they engage in local, non-strategic information exchange,
to mitigate their lack of global, centralized information.
Firms/players may communicate with a local subset of
neighbouring firms in a peer-to-peer manner, via some
underlying communication infrastructure, hence a distributed
9partial-information setting. A communication network formed
Gc between the firms prescribes how they communicate
locally their production decision, [26]. In this situation, the
communication network is formed by the players who are
viewed as the nodes in the network. In this example, we
consider that most of the communication is between firms on
the same continent, with one or at most two firms in each
continent having a direct connection to another firm on another
continent. One such instance of the communication network
Gc is shown in Figure 2. Firms i and j are able to exchange
their local variables if there exists an edge between them on
this graph. Various other topologies can be considered, with
different connectivity.
A. Assumptions
Consider that firm i’s production cost is a strongly convex,
quadratic function ci(xi) = xTi Qixi+q
T
i xi with Qi ∈ Rni×ni
symmetric and Qi  0 and qi ∈ Rni . Consider that market
Mk’s price is a linear function of the total commodity amount
supplied to it, pk(x) = P¯k − χk[Ax]k (known as a linear
inverse demand function) with P¯k, χk > 0. We show that all
assumptions required for Algorithm 1 are satisfied.
Denote P = [pk]k=1,m : Rn → Rm, P¯ = [P¯k]k=1,m ∈
Rm, Ξ = diag([χk]k=1,m) ∈ Rm×m, so that P = P¯ − ΞAx
is the vector price function, and PTAixi is the payoff of firm
i obtained by selling xi amount to the markets that it connects
with. Thus, the objective function of player i is,
Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi)− (P¯ − ΞAx)TAixi, and (40)
∇iJi(x) = ∇ci(xi)+ATi ΞAixi−ATi (P¯−ΞAx), (41)
where ∇ci(xi) = 2Qixi + qi. Then, with x = [xi]i∈N , A =
[A1, · · ·AN ], ∇c(x) = 2diag([Qi]i∈N )x + [qi]i∈N , we can
write F (x) = [∇iJi(x)]i∈N compactly as compactly as,
F (x) = Qx+ h, where Q := Σ +ATΞA, (42)
Σ := diag
(
[2Qi+A
T
i ΞAi]i∈N
)
and h := [qi]i∈N−AT P¯ . Since
Qi  0 and Ξ  0 (by χk > 0), it follows that Σ  0 and
ATΞA  0, hence Q  0. Thus, F (x) is strongly monotone
(µ = smin(Q) > 0), and Lipschitz continuous with θ0 = ‖Q‖
where ‖Q‖ = σmax(Q), and Assumptions 1, 2 are satisfied.
We show next that Assumption 4 is satisfied and θ = θ0.
Using (41) with x replaced by xi = (xi,xi−i), yields
∇iJi(xi) = ∇ci(xi) +ATi ΞAixi −ATi (P¯ − ΞAxi).
Thus, F(x) := [∇iJi(xi)]i∈N , (20), is given by F(x) =
∇c(x) + diag([ATi ΞAi]i∈N )x−AT P¯ + diag([ATi ΞA]i∈N )x
where x = [xi]i∈N . Combining the first three terms
(with ∇c(x), x = Rx, Σ and h defined above), and
diag
(
[RiATΞA]i∈N
)
= R(IN ⊗ ATΞA) = for the last
term, we can write F(x) = ΣRx + h + R(IN ⊗ ATΞA) x.
Since Σ is block-diagonal, ΣR = R(IN ⊗ Σ), so that
F(x) = R(IN ⊗ (Σ+ATΞA))x + h, which, with Q as in
(42), is
F(x) = R(IN ⊗Q) x + h. (43)
Hence, ‖F(x)−F(y)‖ ≤ ‖R(IN⊗Q)‖‖x−y‖ ≤ ‖R‖‖IN⊗
Q‖‖x− y‖ ≤ ‖Q‖‖x− y‖, since ‖R‖ = 1 and ‖IN ⊗Q‖ =
‖Q‖. Hence, F(x) is Lipschitz and Assumption 4 holds with
θ = θ0 = ‖Q‖.
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Fig. 4. The trajectories of dual variables λi,k for selected players (c = 100)
B. Numerical results
Consider Figure 1 (N = 20 and m = 7). For the
communication graph Gc in Fig. 2, with weighted adjacency
matrix W = [wij ] having all its nonzero elements as 1,
λ2(L) = 0.102. We consider 0 ≤ xi ≤ Xi where each
component of Xi is randomly drawn from (5, 10). Each market
Mk has a maximal capacity of rk, where rk is randomly drawn
from (1, 2). Player i’s objective function is taken as (40),
where in ci(xi) = xTi Qixi + q
T
i xi, Qi is diagonal with its
entries randomly drawn from (1, 8), and each component of
qi is randomly from (1, 2). In the price function P = P¯−ΞAx,
P¯k and χk are randomly drawn from (10, 20) and (1, 3),
respectively. For Q, (42), this yields smin(Q) = 1.001 = µ,
smax(Q) = 2.09 = θ, and the lower bound for c in Lemma
3 is 62.5. We set c = 100 and τi = 0.003, νi = 0.02 and
σi = 0.003 for all firms, which satisfy (32). The results for the
implementation of Algorithm 1 in the partial-decision setting,
where the primal and dual variables are exchanged over the
sparsely connected graph Gc (Fig. 2), are shown in Fig. 3, 4.
The algorithm converges to the same GNE found by [17],
with a comparable rate of convergence. Unlike [17], here the
primal variables are not perfectly known, but estimated. In
fact, the lower bound for c in Lemma 3 is quite conservative.
For comparison, we set c = 10 and increase the step-sizes
ten times (still satisfying (32)). The simulation results for the
same initial conditions are shown in Fig. 5 and indicate fast
convergence.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a partial-decision
information setting and we proposed a fully-distributed,
primal-dual algorithm for computation of a variational
GNE in noncooperative games with globally-shared affine
coupling constraints. The algorithm is motivated by a
forward-backward splitting method for finding zeros of a
sum of doubly-augmented monotone operators. We proved
its convergence with fixed step-sizes over any connected
graph, by leveraging monotone operator-splitting techniques.
In future work we will consider mechanism designs so that
players faithfully report their variables.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to acknowledge
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: With xi,k = xii,k = Rixik, xji,k =
Rixjk, the first line of Algorithm 1 is written as xi,k+1 =
PΩi
[
xi,k−τi(∇xiJi(xi,k,xi−i,k)+ATi λi,k+cRi
∑
j∈Ni wij(x
i
k−
xjk))
]
. Then, for all players in stacked notation, with F(x),
(20), A, Lx, R and P∏N
i=1 Ωi
(x) = col(PΩi(xi))i∈N , [34,
Prop. 23.16], the x-update can be written as (16). With
xj−i,k = Si xjk, the second line in Algorithm 1 is Si xik+1 =
Si xik − τicSi
∑
j∈Ni wij(x
i
k − xjk). In stacked notation, with
col(xi−i)i∈N = Sx, this gives (17). Proceeding similarly for
the 3rd and 4th line of Algorithm 1 yields (18) and (19). 2
Proof of Lemma 2: (i) We show that expanding (23) for
$k=col(xk, zk,λk), we obtain (16)-(19) in Lemma 1, hence
Algorithm 1. First, recall τx = diag((τiIni)i∈N ). By using
R=diag((Ri)i∈N ) and (13), it can be shown that τxR=Rτ ,
where τ =diag((τiIn)i∈N ), (22). Similarly, τsS=Sτ . Hence,
with RRT =In and RTR+STS=INn (cf. (15)), this yields
τx=RτRT and RT τxR+ST τsS=τ .
Using A, B, (21), Φ, (22), the update for xk in (23) is
−RTF(xk) −cLx xk ∈ RTNΩ(Rxk+1) +RTATλk+1
+τ−1(xk+1 − xk)−RTAT (λk+1 − λk)
(44)
which means that for some v ∈ NΩ(Rxk+1) = NΩ(xk+1),
−τRTF(xk)−τ cLx xk=τRT (v+ATλk)+xk+1−xk. (45)
Premultiplying (45) by R yields
−RτRTF(xk)−Rτ cLxxk=RτRT (v+ATλk)+R(xk+1−xk)
With RτRT =τx, Rτ =τxR, and Rx= x, this yields
−τxF(xk)− τxcRLx xk = τx(v +ATλk) + xk+1 − xk,
for v ∈ NΩ(xk+1), hence
xk − τx(F(xk) +ATλk + cRLx xk) ∈ xk+1 + τxNΩ(xk+1).
Note that τxNΩ(x) =
∏N
i=1 τiNΩi(xi) = NΩ(x), since τi >
0, NΩ is a cone and NΩ(x) =
∏N
i=1NΩi(xi). With PΩ(x) =
(Id +NΩ)
−1(x), the foregoing gives (16).
Premultiplying (45) by S , using SτRT =τsSRT , SRT =0,
(15) yields −Sτ cLx xk=S(xk+1−xk). With Sτ =τsS, this
is (17). The reverse direction, from (16),(17) to (44) can be
shown similarly, withRTR+STS=INn,RT τxR+ST τsS=τ .
Thus the xk update in (23) is equivalent to (16), (17).
The zk update in (23) is0 =−Lλλk+1 +ν−1(zk+1−zk)+
Lλ(λk+1 − λk),, which is (18). The λk update in (23) is
−[Lλ λk + b] ∈ NRNm+ (λk+1)−ARxk+1 + Lλ zk+1
−AR(xk+1 − xk) + Lλ (zk+1 − zk) + σ−1(λk+1 − λk).
With x = Rx this reduces to
λk + σ[A(2xk+1 − xk)− b− Lλ (2zk+1 − zk)− Lλ λk]
∈ NRNm+ (λk+1) + λk+1,
which is (19), by σ−1NRNm+ (λ)=NRNm+ (λ) and PRNm+ (λ)=
(Id+NRNm+ )
−1. Thus, (16)-(19) are equivalent to (23).
Since Φ  0, (23) is equivalent to
(Id− Φ−1B)($k) ∈ (Id + Φ−1A)($k+1). (46)
In turn, since Φ−1A is maximally monotone, it follows that
(Id + Φ−1A)−1 is single-valued (by [34, Prop. 23.7]), so that
(46) is equivalently written as (24).
(ii) Suppose that Algorithm 1, or (24), has a limit point
$ = col(x, z,λ). By the continuity of the right-hand-side of
Algorithm 1, the following equivalences hold,
$ = (Id + Φ−1A)−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1B)$:= T2 ◦ T1$ (47)
⇔ (Id− Φ−1B)($) ∈ (Id + Φ−1A)($)
⇔ 0 ∈ (Φ−1A+ Φ−1B)($)
⇔ 0 ∈ (A+B)($).
Hence, $ ∈ zer(A+B) and is a fixed point of T2 ◦ T1. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: Recall the decomposition of RNn into
RNn = Ex ⊕ E⊥x where Ex = Null(Lx) is the estimate
consensus subspace and E⊥x = Null(Lx)
⊥ its orthogonal
complement. Any x ∈ RNn can be decomposed as x =
x‖ + x⊥, with x‖ ∈ Ex, x⊥ ∈ E⊥x and (x‖)Tx⊥ = 0,
by using two projection matrices P‖ = 1N 1N ⊗ 1TN ⊗ In,
P⊥ = INn − 1N 1N ⊗ 1TN ⊗ In. Thus x‖ = 1N ⊗ x, for some
x ∈ Rn, so that Lxx‖ = 0, and minx⊥∈E⊥x (x⊥)TLxx⊥ =
s2(L)‖x⊥‖2, where s2(L) > 0. Any x′ ∈ Ex can be written
as x′ = 1N ⊗ x′, for some x′ ∈ Rn, such that Lxx′ = 0.
Then, using x = x‖ + x⊥, F(x‖) = F (x), F(x′) = F (x′),
Rx‖ = x, Rx′ = x′, yields
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))
= (x‖−x′)TRT (F(x)−F(x‖)+F(x‖)−F(x′))
+(x⊥)TRT (F(x)−F(x‖)+F(x‖)−F(x′))
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+c(x‖+x⊥ −x′)TLx(x‖ + x⊥−x′)
)
= (x− x′)T(F(x)−F(x‖))+ (x− x′)T(F (x)− F (x′))
+(x⊥)TRT (F(x)−F(x‖))+(x⊥)TRT (F (x)−F (x′))
+c(x⊥)TLxx⊥ (48)
Using strong monotonicity of F (by Assumption 2) for the
second term, and properties of Lx on E⊥x = Null(Lx)
⊥ for
the fifth term on the right-hand side we can write,
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))
≥ (x− x′)T(F(x)−F(x‖))+ µ‖x− x′‖2
+(x⊥)TRT (F(x)−F(x‖))+(x⊥)TRT (F (x)−F (x′))
+cs2(L)‖x⊥‖2 (49)
We deal with the cross-terms by using aT b ≥ −‖a‖‖b‖, for
any a, b, and ‖RT b‖ ≤ ‖RT ‖‖b‖, so that
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))≥
−‖x− x′‖ ‖F(x)−F(x‖)‖+ µ‖x− x′‖2 + cs2(L)‖x⊥‖2
−‖x⊥‖‖RT ‖‖F(x)−F(x‖)‖−‖x⊥‖‖RT ‖‖F (x)−F (x′)‖
Using ‖RT ‖ = 1 and Lipschitz properties of F and F,
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))≥
−θ‖x− x′‖ ‖x⊥‖+ µ‖x− x′‖2 − θ‖x⊥‖2− θ0‖x⊥‖‖x−y‖
+cs2(L)‖x⊥‖2 (50)
Using ‖x− x′‖ = 1√
N
‖x‖−x′‖ and Ψ, (29), we can write
(x−x′)T(RT (F(x)−F(x′))+cLx(x−x′))
≥
[ ‖x‖−x′‖
‖x⊥‖
]T
Ψ
[ ‖x‖−x′‖
‖x⊥‖
]
Thus, for any x and any x′ ∈ Ex, (x− x′)T
(RTF(x)−
RTF(x′) + cLx(x− x′)
) ≥ µ¯ (‖x‖−x′‖2 + ‖x⊥‖2), where
µ¯ := smin(Ψ). With ‖x‖−x′‖2 + ‖x⊥‖2 = ‖x−x′‖2, this
is (30). For c > cmin as in the statement, Ψ  0, µ¯ > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4: (i): The operator A (21) is written as
A=A1+A2, where A1=RTNΩR(x)×0Nm×NRNm+ (λ) and
A2 the skew-symmetric matrix in (21) (maximally monotone
by [34, Ex. 20.30]). NΩ and NRNm+ are maximally monotone
(normal cones of closed convex sets, [34, Thm. 20.40], as is
0Nm. Since R is full row rank, RT◦NΩ◦R is also maximally
monotone, [33, Prop. 12.5.5]. As the direct sum of maximally
monotone operators, A1 is maximally monotone, [34, Prop.
20.23], and since domA2 =RNn+2Nm, A is also maximally
monotone, [34, Cor. 24.4].
(ii): Let $=col(x, z, λ), $′=col(x′, z′, λ′). For B, (21),
〈$ −$′,B$ −B$′〉 (51)
= 〈x−x′,RTF(x)−RTF(x′)+cLxx−cLxx′〉
+ 〈λ− λ′,Lλ λ− Lλ λ′〉
Note that operator Lx is ‖Lx‖-Lipschitz, with ‖Lx‖ =
sN (L) ≤ 2d∗, Then, by the triangle inequality, using Lipschitz
continuity of F (Assumption 4) and ‖R‖ = 1, we can write,
‖RTF(x)−RTF(x′)+cLxx−cLxx′‖≤ θ¯‖x−x′‖ (52)
for any x and x′, where θ¯=θ+2cd∗.
By Lemma 3, for the first term on the right-hand side of
(51), (30) holds for any x and any x′ ∈ Ex. Using this and
(52), we can write, for any x and any x′ ∈ Ex,
〈x−x′,RTF(x)−RTF(x′)+cLxx−cLxx′〉
≥ µ¯
θ¯2
‖RTF(x)+cLxx−RTF(x′)−cLxx′‖2. (53)
For the second term on the right-hand side of (51), we note
that since Lλ is symmetric, Lλ λ is the gradient of f˜(λ) :=
1
2λ
TLλλ, which is convex since ∇2f˜(λ) = Lλ  0 (by
Assumption 3). As the ‖Lλ‖−Lipschitz continuous gradient of
a convex function, it follows that Lλλ is 1‖Lλ‖ -cocoercive, (by
Baillon-Haddad theorem, [34, Thm. 18.15]), where 1‖Lλ‖ ≥
1
2d∗ . Thus, for any λ and λ
′,
〈λ− λ′,Lλ λ− Lλ λ′〉 ≥ 1
2d∗
‖Lλ λ− Lλ λ′‖2. (54)
Then, for any $ and any $′ ∈ ΩE , since x′ ∈ Ex, using (53)
and (54) in (51), it follows that
〈$ −$′,B$ −B$′〉
= 〈x−x′,RTF(x)−RTF(x′)+cLxx−cLxx′〉
+ 〈λ− λ′,Lλ λ− Lλ λ′〉
≥ µ¯
θ¯2
‖RTF(x)+cLxx−RTF(x′)−cLxx′‖2
+
1
2d∗
‖Lλ λ− Lλ λ′‖2
≥ min{ µ¯
θ¯2
,
1
2d∗
}‖B$ −B$′‖2
Hence, (31) holds for any 0 <β≤min{ µ¯
θ¯2
, 12d∗ }. 2
Proof of Lemma 6: (i) For any ($,u) ∈ graΦ−1A and
($′, v) ∈ graΦ−1A, Φu ∈ ΦΦ−1A($) ∈ A($) and Φv ∈
ΦΦ−1A($′) ∈ A($′). Since Φ  0 (cf. Lemma 5) and A is
maximally monotone (cf. Lemma 4(i)), 〈$ −$′, u − v〉Φ =
〈$ − $′,Φ(u − v)〉 ≥ 0,∀$,$′ ∈ domA, and Φ−1A is
maximally monotone under the Φ−induced inner product. By
[34, Prop. 23.7], T2 = (Id + Φ−1A)−1 is firmly nonexpansive
under the Φ−induced norm ‖ · ‖Φ, hence T2 ∈ A( 12 ).
(ii) By Lemma 5, Φ − δIn+2Nm  0, hence the eigenvalues
of Φ satisfy smax(Φ) ≥ smin(Φ) ≥ δ. By (31) in Lemma 4,
for any $ and any $′ ∈ ΩE it holds that,
〈$−$′,Φ−1B$−Φ−1B$′〉Φ =〈B$−B$′,$−$′〉
≥β‖B$−B$′‖2
(55)
Since B is single-valued and Φ  0,
smax(Φ
−1)‖B$−B$′‖2 ≥〈B$−B$′,Φ−1(B$−B$′)〉
= 〈ΦΦ−1(B$ −B$′),Φ−1(B$ −B$′)〉
= ‖Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′‖2Φ.
Using smax(Φ−1) = 1/smin(Φ) ≤ 1/δ, it follows that
‖B$−B$′‖2 ≥ δ‖Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′‖2Φ. Using this
in (55), yields that, for any $ and any $′ ∈ ΩE , 〈$−
$′,Φ−1B$−Φ−1B$′〉Φ≥βδ‖Φ−1B$−Φ−1B$′‖2Φ, hence
Φ−1B is βδ-restricted cocoercive. Then, for T1 = Id−Φ−1B,
using this property, we can write for any $ and any $′ ∈ ΩE ,
‖T1$−T1$′‖2Φ = ‖$ −$′ − Φ−1B$ + Φ−1B$′‖2Φ
= ‖$ −$′‖2Φ + ‖Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′‖2Φ
−2〈$ −$′,Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′〉Φ
≤ ‖$ −$′‖2Φ + ‖Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′‖2Φ
−2βδ‖Φ−1B$ − Φ−1B$′‖2Φ
which is (33). Hence, since 2βδ > 1 by assumption, ‖T1$−
T1$
′‖2Φ ≤ ‖$ −$′‖2Φ (T1 is restricted nonexpansive). 2
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